Gambling results of 14 film and television companies: nearly 80% passed the test "thrilling"
Statistics were made on the gambling agreements of 14 listed film and television companies. Although 80% of the gambling pairs had been completed, almost all of them had just reached the gambling line and "passed the pass through the competition."
Author: Light and Shadow Heavy Plum
Source: Yulezibenlun
With the successive disclosures of the 2015 annual report, many film and television companies in the category of "gambling" have handed over initial answers:
Ferris Wheel once promised to A-share listed company Beijing Culture to achieve a net profit of 20 million yuan in 2015, but actually only 9.2 million yuan was completed. The main reason for the poor box office of movies such as "Junior Class";
Blue Flame also failed to fulfill the performance promised to Hualu Baina due to the poor ratings of the two programs "Dreammaker" and "To the End of the World";
In addition, Enlight Media also made it clear that its Hot Front Technology had not completed the gambling; Huayi Brothers' performance bet with Yinhan Technology was even questioned by the outside world and accused of" stealing the concept."
Therefore, we conducted statistics on the gambling agreements of 14 listed film and television companies. We found that although 80% of the gambling pairs had been completed, almost all of them had just reached the gambling line and "passed the test narrowly."
Listed companies gamble together, and nearly 80% of them pass the test "narrowly".
"On the one hand, investors do not have strong control over cultural content and use gambling to bind the company; the bigger reason is that listed companies are under profit pressure and hope to use gambling to give themselves and the market a 'booster&# 39;', industry insiders said.
The reporter counted 14 gambling cases involving 10 listed companies. We found that film and television listed companies almost always use gambling agreements in mergers and acquisitions.
Among the 14 gambling agreements, except for Light's Hot Front Technology and Guangdong Media's Champs Elysees Media, which have clearly not completed them, 12 companies have completed the gambling agreements, with a completion rate of 80%. For the Ferris wheel and blue flames mentioned above, although the betting match in 2015 was not completed, the results in 2014 and 2015 have accumulated and the betting match has been completed (details will be elaborated later).
Looking at the 12 companies that completed gambling agreements, the vast majority of them were "thrilling promotions", with overcompleting within 5 million yuan. Only the 6 rooms of Songcheng Performing Arts exceeded 10 million yuan, but the overcompletion rate was less than 10%.
"There is no point in overfulfilling, as long as it reaches the line." An investor said that most of these acquired companies are consolidated companies. No matter how much they complete, they will "turn over" to listed companies, promising that the company or individual can only get very few rewards, so many invested companies have the idea of "live for 60 cents".
The Ferris wheel and blue flames are "difficult to meet the standards", but they still "escaped".
Compared with most companies that "pass the assessment", some companies have not been able to cross the gambling line.
When Beijing Culture acquired the Ferris Wheel (formerly known as Beijing Guangjing Ruixing Culture Media Co., Ltd.) at the end of 2013, the Ferris Wheel promised that the current net profit in 2015 would be more than 22 million yuan, but the actual net profit audited by the company was only 9.2 million yuan, which was not completed.
However, according to the calculation formula of the compensation agreement: annual compensation amount = cumulative forecast net profit as of the end of the current period-cumulative actual net profit as of the end of the current period-compensated amount. The Ferris Wheel promised to accumulate a net profit of nearly 40 million yuan in 2014 + 2015, and the actual completion in two years was more than 51 million yuan. It barely passed the test by using the method of cumulative performance.
Beijing Culture has transformed from traditional tourism and hotel businesses to film and television brokerage businesses. According to the annual report, revenue from tourism and hotels is 150 million yuan, accounting for 43.98%, and film and television and brokerage income is 190 million yuan, accounting for 56.02%. Although the transformation from income ratio has been successful, the overall data is not optimistic.
In 2015, the films "The Seventh Son","Junior Class","Guibao's Comes into the Universe" and "The City in Love" had not achieved ideal incomes. The film "Junior Class", which suffered the most serious losses, did not have a good box office. Beijing Culture only received 9.3 million yuan in revenue.
A similar case is Blue Flame. In 2014, it "sold" the listed company Hualu Baina for a record price of 2.5 billion yuan, which aroused collective amazement in the industry. In 2015, due to the benefits of projects such as variety shows "Dreammakers" and "Going to the End of the World", the net profit was 235 million yuan, which was 15 million less than the performance commitment of 250 million yuan. Such a profit situation has been affected by the annual profit of more than 700 million yuan. Canxing stars are far behind.
Fortunately, Blue Flame and Hualu Baina bet on the performance of the bet, and the same calculation is the cumulative net profit for three years, so the two years of 2014 + 2015 can barely pass.
"Film and television companies are more obvious in years. Sometimes the performance is surprisingly good, and sometimes it is scary low. Therefore, most of them will use accumulated profits to calculate it." A practitioner said to Xiaoyu.
Huayi's annual report cited controversy,"parent company" became a key word for interpretation
. Recently, some media exposed that Huayi Brothers 'annual report was suspected of "fraud" and stole the "net profit attributable to the parent company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses" in the gambling agreement into "net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses" in the annual report helped Yinhan Technology pass the test smoothly.
Reports show that when Huayi acquired a 50.8% stake in game company Yinhan Technology in 2013, Yinhan Technology promised that the net profit attributable to the parent company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses in 2013, 2014, and 2015 should not be less than 110 million, 140 million, and 180 million yuan respectively. However, Huayi's 2015 annual report confused the concept into net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses.
In response to such accusations, a person close to the M & A transaction revealed to Xiaoyu that the key to the problem is the difference in understanding of the "parent company": the skeptics believe that the "parent company" in the gambling agreement is understood as Huayi, so the 180 million yuan promised by Yinhan Technology should refer to the net profit handed over to Huayi. In Huayi's annual report, the "parent company" is understood as Yinhan Technology, so 180 million yuan is actually Yinhan Technology's net profit.
If the "parent company" is understood to be Yinhan Technology, then Yinhan Technology's net profit in 2015 was 240 million yuan, which has already successfully completed the bet. However, if the "parent company" is understood to be Huayi Brothers, Yinhan Technology has only achieved a net profit of about 120 million yuan., 62 million yuan less than originally promised.
"There is indeed a problem with the expression of the gambling agreement, which causes ambiguity in understanding, but from a factual perspective, the parent company should refer to Yinhan Technology." A securities analyst said.
In 2013, Huayi Brothers once controlled Yinhan Technology at a valuation of 1.3 billion yuan. If the performance commitment of net profit of 110 million yuan for that year is based on the performance commitment of 110 million yuan, the PE will be approximately 11.8 times. However, if the 110 million yuan is determined to be the net profit to be handed over to Huayi, it means that Yinhan's promised performance that year was about 220 million yuan. When Huayi acquired it, Yinhan Technology's PE would be only about 6 times, which is not in line with common sense.
Also in 2013, Zhebao Group acquired game companies Haofang Technology and Winger Technology for 2.5 billion to 100%, with a PE of 10. Mergers and acquisitions in the same field in the same year would not be so different. If the "parent company" refers to Huayi, the difference is obvious. A bit big.
Since most cultural companies are "asset-light", it is difficult to evaluate through asset evaluation during mergers and acquisitions, so predicting performance has become a very important valuation method. In other words, raising performance commitments will help the acquired company increase its valuation and sell it at a good price; it will also help the market value of listed companies increase.
However, in the past few years, we have seen too many cases of "falsely high valuations". Even if the gambling competition is not completed, it will end up being ignored. This has inspired investors to be suspicious about the "gambling competition" and even "presumption of guilt". Although the "spat" on gambling performance in Huayi's annual report is a case, it also reflects investors 'anxiety about various "hidden rules on gambling" to a certain extent.
Editor: yvonne